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True believers or moral absolutists? 
TAN SEOW HON 
 
Published in Straits Times, 15 November 2004 
 
THE recent American presidential elections brought to the fore the question of what place moral 
values have in public decision-making when traditional moral values are not espoused by all in a 
pluralist society. 
 
Even if traditional values - seen as absolutist - are imposed on others through a democratic electoral 
process, that imposition, particularly in hot button issues like abortion and same-sex marriage, 
remains difficult to accept. 
 
What is up for grabs here? 
 
Liberals suggest that conservatives should stop using absolutes to push public decisions. By contrast, 
liberals would allow for maximum individual freedom, as long as others are not harmed in the 
exercise of such freedom. 
 
Because this approach doesn't seems to be dogmatically absolutist, and allows each to choose his or 
her conception of what is moral when we cannot agree on what is good or moral, this seems 
preferable to many. 
 
But it is a misleading claim because allowing everyone to make his own moral choices is equally 
founded on an absolutist notion that human beings are responsible agents whose ability to make those 
choices must be given primacy above other considerations. 
 
That we are subject to no 'law' in making our choices, except to do no harm to others is, in the final 
analysis, actually just another (morally) absolutist claim. That is, this 'autonomy' is dogmatically 
asserted as an unquestionable value. 
 
Now once the liberal claim is understood to be, in reality, also an absolutist moral claim, it becomes 
clear that relying on it in public decision-making should be seen as being as controversial as relying 
on any other absolute moral value. 
 
Yet it is precisely liberals who would resist the very idea of an objective morality because it would 
mean that a moral law giver - a Supreme Being - actually exists. This might lend credibility to a class 
of elites, wise men and priests, say, who claim special access to this knowledge, whose claims cannot 
be contested. 
 
So liberals must posit an alternative. What would that be? The answer is to treat ourselves as the 
source of moral values. According to this view, what is morally right or wrong is a matter of human 
convention or accord, or of subjective personal opinion. But this view is untenable. 
 
How so? 
 
At first blush, relying on conventional morality seems to be a more congenial option than a Supreme 
Being setting the moral law when we do not all believe in God. But really, if morality is merely 
communal or personal, what constrains a group from wiping out another by reference to its subjective 
morality? What prevents might from becoming right? From what vantage point can Hitler's regime be 
criticised? 
 
The idea that morality is subjective, varying from person to person, is also illogical. Some say that 
morality is a matter of opinion, and all opinions are subjective and can't be tested against an objective 
standard. But if all opinions are subjective, the very opinion that all opinions are subjective is itself a 
subjective opinion, in which case we needn't pay much attention to it. 
 
Further, if we claim that our moral opinions are personal and can't be tested against any independent 
standard, we shut down genuine dialogue. We apparently respect all persons by treating all views as 
equally valid. Yet, if one view is as valid as the other, neither person can begin to persuade the other 
of the soundness of his view, for soundness connotes some independent objective standard. 
 
If each is simply entitled to his subjective opinion, the view of each cannot be subject to re-
examination against the view of the other. It is this false modesty of subjectivity that cuts off dialogue. 
 
So we are left with morality being an objective enterprise, scary as it sounds. Whether we rely on 
autonomy or some other moral value, whether we are liberal or conservative (or something else in this 
spectrum), we start from absolutes. 
 
What follows? 
 
The best we can do within a pluralist society is to retain the framework of a democracy within which a 
genuine dialogue on absolutes can take place, in which we all acknowledge that we claim to be 
correct and objective when we put forth our views. Of course we believe that our views are correct! 
Why else would we hold one view among various alternatives, or bother to have a dialogue about 
them? 
 
Acknowledging that we are claiming to be right smacks not of arrogance, but of true humility and 
honesty. We admit that in trying to persuade others, we are at least implicitly claiming that the views 
we hold dear are correct, against an independent standard. 
 
Yes, we have to hear the other out, and may be corrected upon hearing his or her view. 
 
This, surely, paves the way for true dialogue. 
 
After all, how can we begin to know one another unless we are honest with each other? 
 
